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1Pedagogy as “Cryptic Politics”: Benjamin, Nietzsche, and the End of Education
Matthew Charles
In a review article published in boundary 2 in 2003, T. J. Clark asks, “Should Benjamin 
Have Read Marx?” His answer is ambiguous: rejecting a scholarly tendency to dismiss 
Benjamin’s “flirtation” with Marxism as a “period phenomenon” that “can only be seen as a 
cancer on Benjamin’s work,” Clark argues that a Marxist mode of thought “is pervasive, vital, 
and superficial” within The Arcades Project (2003: 41). When Benjamin seeks to re-
conceptualize revolution in terms of “innervations of the technical organs of the collective” by 
way of a “cracking open” of natural teleology – definitively declaring both as “articles of my 
politics” (1999a: 631) – Clark describes these articles and their accompanying declaration as 
“cryptic,…as if such a politics were being actively aired and developed elsewhere” (2003: 45-
46).
Clark resists constructing a “Red Benjamin,” however, insisting instead that Benjamin’s 
merely superficial acquaintance with “Marxist method” inures him from its theoretical excesses 
of chialism and scientism (2003: 32, 44). As his subsequent writing makes evident, the 
alternative but latent perspective he seeks to rescue from The Arcades Project – whose success 
lies in sketching “the truly dark history of the working class …class poverty, exploitation, 
nihilism, and suicide …without consolation” for which “truly no redeemer liveth” – owes its 
descriptive analysis of bourgeois society to Marxism but its tragic historical prognosis to 
Nietzsche.1 Esther Leslie (2008: 557-8) has rightly objected that Clark fails to register the extent 
of Benjamin’s more than superficial acquaintance with Marxist theory but it is also important to 
2recognize, contrary to Clark’s suggestion, that Benjamin’s attempts to restore a “genuinely 
messianic face…to the concept of classless society…in the interest of furthering the 
revolutionary politics of the proletariat itself” (2003: 403) constitutes the precise political 
inversion of Nietzsche’s early philosophy.
Celebrating the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871 in a letter to Baron von Gersdorff, 
Nietzsche declares himself in good spirits because not everything had capitulated to what he calls 
“Franco-Jewish levelling” and “the greedy instincts of Jetztzeit” (Lukács 1981: 235). Nietzsche 
was particularly agitated by reports circulating in the European press that the retreating 
Communards had torched the Louvre and the anti-egalitarian view of culture put forward in The 
Greek State is formulated against the backdrop of these events:
Accordingly, we must learn to identify as a cruel-sounding truth the fact that slavery 
belongs to the essence of a culture: a truth, granted, that leaves open no doubt about 
the absolute value of existence…. The misery of men living a life of toil has to be 
increased to make the production of the world of art possible for a small number of 
Olympian men…. Therefore, we may compare the magnificent culture to a victor 
dripping with blood, who, in his triumphal procession, drags the vanquished along, 
chained to his carriage as slaves. (2007: 166)
Significantly, Benjamin does not object to or criticize this conception of culture in the famous 
lines from the late theses “On the Concept of History,” but draws from it the opposite political 
conclusion:
Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession 
in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to 
traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession. They are called 
3cultural treasures, and a historical materialist…cannot contemplate [them] without 
horror. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents 
who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There 
is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. (2003: 391-2)
Benjamin’s inverted Nietzscheanism retains a critical suspicion towards culture and a 
rejection of certain bourgeois values but is oriented towards a historical remembrance of the 
oppressed and an overcoming of the oppressive material conditions of existing cultural 
production and reproduction.2 In this it perhaps has less in common with Clark’s tragic nihilism 
and more with Malcolm Bull’s strategy of sidestepping Nietzsche’s rhetoric by identifying with 
the victims of these texts: “In order to read like a loser you have to accept the argument but turn 
its consequences against yourself” (Bull 2011: 37). To speak of Benjamin’s anti-Nietzscheanism 
is, however, not to devalue the enduring significance of Nietzsche’s philosophy for his thought 
but to indicate the struggle to delineate an alternative exit route from its tragic perspective than 
that proposed in the aesthetic affirmation of Nietzsche’s early works or the Zarathustran 
overcoming of his later ones. This approach provides Benjamin with a catastrophic vision of 
history redeemable by a recuperation of the same revolutionary Jeztzeit that Nietzsche identified 
with the “Franco-Jewish levelling” of the Communards.3
The following discussion seeks to extend the implications of this anti-Nietzscheanism – 
and in particular its valorization of revolutionary Jeztzeit and social levelling – beyond the more 
familiar terrain of Benjamin’s dialectical engagement with the crisis of art and culture (most 
famously in the Work of Art essay’s opposition to the aestheticization of politics) into what has 
been declared – from Hannah Arendt (2006 [1954]: 172) to Martha Nussbaum (2010: 73-7) – to 
4be a comparable crisis in formal systems of mass education over the last half century. To do so, it 
will begin by exploring the influence of Nietzsche’s early educational writings on Benjamin’s 
own early understanding of the cultural significance of Youth, before examining Benjamin’s 
attempt to distance himself from the tragic consequences of this position in his later writings. 
The argument in the first part of this article is that the nature of Benjamin’s break from certain 
Nietzschean features of his own writings on Youth constitutes the “cryptic” submerging – but not 
disappearance – of this pedagogical layer of his philosophy.
I.
For the first time in my life, I understand Goethe’s words: “Only where you are let 
everything be– always childlike [Nur wo du bist sei alles—immer kindlich]. Thus you are 
everything – you are invincible.”
- Walter Benjamin (letter of May 5, 1913)
Nietzsche’s early reflections on the political foundations of classical and modern culture 
in The Greek State (and The Birth of Tragedy, in which the essay was originally intended to be 
included) are the prelude to a broader analysis of education developed in a series of public 
lectures On the Future of Our Educational Institutions and in the Untimely Meditations.4 In his 
first lecture, Nietzsche – comparing himself to a Roman hauerspex who steals a glimpse of the 
Future from the sacrificed entrails of the Present – discerns two tendencies in German 
educational institutions: the tendency to maximize and extend education to the greatest number of 
people and the tendency to minimize and impoverish education by professionalizing it in relation 
to the State (Nietzsche 2009).
5The first is driven, in part, by an enlightened fear of the oppressive nature of older 
religious power, and would promote culture through education as a secular counterforce capable 
of scattering these religious instincts. But it is also motivated by what Nietzsche pointedly calls 
the “dogmas” of modern political economy: a narrow and short-term utilitarianism of needs that 
stems from the factitious bond drawn between intelligence and property. Education furthers the 
interests of the economy to the extent that, in as rapid a manner as possible, it rears men who are 
current in the same ways coins have currency. Here, Nietzsche anticipates the secularized and 
foreshortened version of the religious concept of ‘the vocational’ that dominants the rhetoric of 
contemporary systems of mass education and, in the linking of intelligence and property, its 
accompanying drive to credentialism (see Osborne 2010). Consequently, the bourgeoisie seeks to 
conserve and reproduce its power by furthering the modern forces of culture against the older 
ones of religion, while attempting to yoke and tame the liberating powers of culture in 
accordance with its own economic interests.
The second tendency to weaken education is not opposed to this extension but 
complements it through the subordination of all strivings after education to reasons of State, as 
manifested in the idea of the Kulturstaat associated with Hegel, Fichte, Humboldt, and others 
(Jarausch 1982: 160-161). In contrast to the classical and aristocratic ideal of a genuine 
education for culture, measured by the cultivation of great spiritual, philosophical and artistic 
individuals, the State must intervene in education to drive the few individuals of genius into exile 
in order to “liberate” the masses into barbarism by convincing them they are capable of thinking, 
acting and discovering for themselves, under the guidance of the State.
In a sentiment similar to that expressed in The Greek State, one of the young student 
interlocutors in On the Future of Our Educational Institutions recalls the “cardinal principle of 
6all culture,” as taught by the older philosopher: “[N]o one would strive to attain culture if he 
knew how incredibly small the number of really cultured people actually is, and can ever be” and 
how reliant such culture is on “the prodigious multitude” who, “led on by an alluring 
delusion...devote themselves to education” even though they can never themselves be cultured 
(Nietzsche 2009). Those who pursue the education of the “stupid, dull masses” and “regard as 
their goal the emancipation of the masses from the mastery of the great few” therefore seek to 
overthrow the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect: “the servitude of the masses, 
their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the rule of genius.”
In an important and characteristic development, Nietzsche makes clear that these two 
destructive tendencies find their perfect combination in journalism. Since journalism is defined 
by its devotion to the present – the reproduction of the timely or fashionable aspects of the day 
(jour) – it radically deflates the temporal horizons of education, conflating the means and the end 
of education into the “present day”: a journalistic pseudo-education aims at nothing but – indeed, 
already is – a journalistic pseudo-culture. To adapt Bill Readings’s argument in The University in 
Ruins, the subsequent academic institutionalization of Cultural Studies in the late twentieth 
century “must be understood to arise when culture ceases to be the animating principle of the 
university [that is, its goal or end] and …becomes instead an object of study among others” 
(1996: 92). When Nietzsche’s young student complains that, the “very style” of a “newspaper, 
the latest novel, or one of those learned books…already bears the revolting impress of modern 
barbaric culture,” he introduces the milieu of the cultural philistine, explored in further detail in 
the Untimely Meditations.
Here the very eternity and individuality of the spiritual and cultural leader – who for 
Nietzsche is an unhistorical or transhistorical individual – is rejected for the topicality of the 
7political, literally reducing the new to the political novelty of the news. In this respect, the greedy 
instincts of Jeztzeit may similarly be said to be at work. For, every “philosophy which believes 
that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke- and 
pseudo-philosophy,” Nietzsche writes, for how “should a political innovation suffice to turn men 
once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth?” (1997: 147-8). The vocational 
professionalization of educational institutions in the interests of the State privileges the narrowest 
measure of social utility, one that results in a destructive tendency towards increasing academic 
specialization and that renders the expertise of the intellectual incapable of passing judgement on 
anything but the smallest aspect of contemporary society.
The corrupting substitution of an education-for-culture for a journalist education-as-
politics simultaneously liberates the true intellectual from the antagonistic demands of cultural 
greatness, such that the tensions of philosophical life dissipate into the chatter of journalistic self-
expression. This levelling of cultural distinctions represents a “flight from one’s self,” Nietzsche 
claims, “an ascetic expiration of their cultural impulses, a desperate attempt to annihilate their 
own individuality” (Nietzsche 2009). Journalism represents the corruption of artistic or cultural 
style for Nietzsche. If culture is defined as a “unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the 
life of a people,” as Nietzsche suggests in the Untimely Meditations (1997: 5), modern pseudo-
culture is precisely that ephemeral multiplicity of styles that appears unified only to the cultural 
philistine - who, unlike the philistine of the past who is opposed to culture, is precisely the 
philistine who thinks he or she is cultured – because it reflects back his own chaotic lack of style 
(1997: 7-8). As he writes a decade later in The Gay Science, “One thing is needful. To ‘give 
style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art!” (2001: 163-4). Nietzsche’s writings themselves 
reveal, he confesses, a “modern character …marked by weakness of personality” (1997: 116). 
8Perhaps the great exemplar of such character for Nietzsche is the genius of Goethe, the only 
European who experienced the egalitarianism of the French Revolution with nausea and the 
precursor of what, in his later writings, he will define as the Übermensch: “A strong highly 
cultured human being… What he aspired to was totality …he disciplined himself to a whole, he 
created himself” (2005: 222).
The Politics of Youth
As James McFarland has noted, Benjamin’s own early writings for the German Youth 
Movement are “the place in [his] oeuvre where explicit references to Nietzsche cluster most 
densely,” but also where “a uniquely Benjaminian engagement with the thinker is marshalled and 
simultaneously obscured” (2013: 17-18). That which Irving Wolfharth has called the “politics of 
Youth” (1992: 164) contained in Benjamin’s early writings is indebted to the ideas of the 
progressive educational reformer Gustav Wyneken, whose pedagogical commitment to the Free 
School Community is informed by a classical ideal of erotic education influenced, among other 
things, by aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings. These ideas are developed in 
accordance with Benjamin’s subsequent involvement in the Freiburg and Berlin branches of the 
Independent Students Association, an involvement which eventually led to his break with 
Wyneken.
Benjamin’s politics of Youth draws on a philosophy of history and culture contained in 
the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations on “The Use and Abuse of History for Life.” 
Here Nietzsche protests against the “historical education of modern people” that has in part 
sprung from Hegelian philosophy and that paralyses the natural poetic impulse of Youth, “the 
first generation of fighters and dragon-slayers which will precede a happier and fairer culture and 
9humanity” and “from which alone, as a fruitful soil, a deep and noble culture can grow forth” 
(1997: 116, 121; 2009). Benjamin’s early writing for the German Youth Movement shares a 
similar valorization of Youth as a cultural or even metaphysical concept and as a critique of 
contemporary education, involving an anarchic rejection of the State and a promotion of a higher 
ideal of culture. Benjamin explicitly utilized Nietzsche’s lectures on education in his address to 
the Free Student Congress in 1914 (1994: 66). In “School Reform: A Cultural Movement,” he 
writes that: “The school receives a generation...full of images, which it brings with it from the 
land of the future. After all, the culture of the future is the ultimate goal of school – and for this 
reason it must remain silent before the future that comes toward it in the form of youth” (2011: 
59-60, emphasis added). 
In his discussion of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ from the Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche declared that “our schools and professors simply turn aside from any moral instruction 
or content themselves with formulae… Never were moral teachers more necessary and never 
were they more unlikely to be found” (1997: 133). Benjamin takes up this problem in his 1913 
essay “Moral Education” and, in connection with ideas developed there, in letters to his friend 
Carla Seligson. This discussion extends (via a reference to Nietzsche) the idea of a “new 
youthfulness” into the sphere of “what is probably philosophy of history” (1994: 50). The 
necessity of a moral education charged with the task of the ethical cultivation of students is 
everywhere demanded, and yet the belief that the exertion of moral influence is highly personal 
frequently renders this demand contradictory within formal systems of education. The problem 
arises because (in Kantian terms), “the aim of moral education [sittlichen Erziehung] is the 
formation [Bildung] of the moral will” and yet this pure will is no psychological entity and so not 
subject to empirical influence. This task can therefore “have nothing to do with any type of 
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instruction [Unterricht],” understood as a rationalized means or science of teaching. Benjamin’s 
investigation thus proposes to question “in what way moral education is related to absolute 
pedagogic demands” (2011: 107).
In the absence of such a critique, the pedagogical groundlessness of moral instruction 
means that “nothing further remains than for it to conduct a peculiar sort of civic – instead of 
moral – education, in which everything at bottom voluntary becomes necessary” and ultimately 
justified through appeal to rationalistic or psychological examples intended to influence the 
student (2011: 110-111). Today, the continuing emphasis on vocationality, credentialism and 
narrow specialization in the instruction pertaining to systems of mass education has led to a 
similar concern with the reintroduction of moral or civic education for the development of good 
character, citizenship or resilience.5 As Benjamin points out, the lack of any theoretical 
consideration of how such comportment could be learned within the framework of mass systems 
ensures its amounting to little more than political posturing, however time-consuming and 
wasteful of resources. 
His own problematic solution is to appeal to the “principle of the Free School 
Community, the principle of ethical community,” which is founded on a philosophical idea of 
religiosity (2011: 109). The religious dimension of this community is grounded in the sense that 
“all morality and religiosity originates in solitude with God” (2011: 110). In a letter of 1913, 
Benjamin writes similarly that “we need only to live in rational solitude, somewhat less 
concerned about this difficult present and about ourselves. We will steadfastly rely on young 
people who will find or create the forms for the time between childhood and adulthood” (1994: 
40). Claiming that “the ideal person in relationship to the idea” constitutes a profound form of 
loneliness that is possible only within a perfect community, Benjamin adds that such loneliness 
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“destroys what is human about him” (1994: 50). Another letter asserts that, “in every individual 
who is born, no matter where, and turns out to be young, there is, not ‘improvement,’ but 
perfection from the very start. This is the goal that [Viktor] Hueber so messianically feels is near. 
Today I felt the awesome truth of Christ’s words: Behold, the kingdom of God is not of this 
world, but within us” (1994: 54). In “The Religious Position of the New Youth” (1914), 
Benjamin compares this religiosity to that of the “first Christians, to whom the world likewise 
appeared to be so utterly overflowing with the sacred – which could arise in each and all – that it 
deprived them of the power to speak and act.”  And yet youth is compelled to struggle “as long 
as the religious community does not yet exist”: in such struggle the “figure of the sacred reveals 
itself” (2011: 170). This latter process constitutes a further source for Benjamin’s messianism of 
youth: “It may dismiss no object, no person, for in each (in the advertising kiosk and in the 
criminal) the symbol or the sacred can arise” (2011: 169).
Yet the conditions for such a community are absent, Benjamin admits in writing to 
Seligson, and the “greatest obstacle the youth of today must overcome” is the assessment of them 
as possessing a naïve and sentimentalized innocence that needs to be protected (1994: 51). He 
names the self-awareness of a calling – the older, religious idea of a vocation – knowledge and 
identifies this with guilt. Consequently, “youth must lose its innocence (animal-like innocence) 
in order to become guilty,” but guilt may be expiated only through action, which is always 
innocent: “through the most active, most fervent, and blind fulfilment of duty.” In this way, a 
different kind of innocence –one beyond good and evil – comes about through action, an 
innocence of the sort that Benjamin, like Nietzsche, associated with Goethe (1994: 51). 
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In the absence of a broader community, this blind fulfilment of duty was to resolve itself 
in the most tragic ways. The Youth movement grew significant enough that Wyneken was 
eventually denounced in Bavaria by the Minister for Culture, their journal Anfang banned, and 
the “talking-rooms” in which the students conducted their debates, forced to close. Similar 
accusations were made in the Prussian and Baden parliaments, leading to Wyneken’s expulsion 
from the coalition of Free German Youth and the splitting into factions of the movement’s 
leadership. The outbreak of war in 1914 and Wyneken’s perhaps expedient public support of the 
German war effort sealed these divisions (see Utley 1979 and Utley 1999). As a generation of 
young men were sent to be slaughtered at the front, several members of Benjamin’s student 
circle committed suicide, either in nihilistic despair or political defiance. In particular, the double 
suicide of his closest friend Fritz Heinle in a pact with Rika Seligson (Carla’s sister) in 1914, 
which took place in the branch headquarters of the movement, was compounded by Wyneken’s 
subsequent betrayal of Youth. 
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of these experiences for Benjamin. In 
Benjamin’s early politics of Youth, suicide – the self-sacrifice of the individual as mute protest 
against the inadequacy of justice – represents the intoxicating and dangerous limit of an 
essentially tragic vision.  It is precisely this tragic dimension that Benjamin (not to say Nietzsche 
himself) seeks – and perhaps ultimately fails – to distance himself from in his philosophy. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Benjamin’s traumatic break from the Youth 
Movement does not simultaneously constitute an abandonment of this thought, but contributes to 
the submerging of his political position into what he himself calls a ‘harder, purer, more invisible 
radicalism.’6 As such, it constitutes an unforgettable historical layer of the underground or 
cryptic politics of his later writings. 
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II. 
The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of 
monsters.
- Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks
Benjamin’s next sustained attempt to develop his political thought was to be a large-scale 
study begun in the early 1920s (Steiner 2001: 44, 66). As Uwe Steiner notes, while Benjamin’s 
political thought should be placed “in the context of the Nietzsche-reception in the milieu of 
early Expressionism,” his own “definition of politics” as “the satisfaction of unenhanced 
humanness” is constructed in direct opposition to any Zarathustran politics of the Übermensch, 
which Benjamin now reads as “the most radical and most magnificent realization of the religious 
essence of capitalism” (Steiner 2001: 61-2). 
In his essay Fate and Character from 1919, the contours of an alternative exit route from 
tragic suffering begin to be delineated. Given the melancholic features often associated with the 
character of Benjamin, it is remarkable that this reference to happiness is rooted in a discussion 
of comedy. Yet, although ostensibly a discussion of ancient tragedy and modern comedy, at its 
heart this essay involves a subtle disengagement from Nietzsche. Specifically, Benjamin takes 
issue with Nietzsche’s Heraclitean aphorism in Beyond Good and Evil, that “if a man has 
character, he has an experience that constantly recurs” (1996: 202). Benjamin takes this as 
indicative of a conception of fate that conflates fate (the constantly recurring experience) with 
character, understood in a vague sense as the cause of this fate. This understanding of fate and 
character regards the latter as a network of threads, composed of broad character traits that are 
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connected by finer strands to external events of fate, a network that knowledge tightens – like the 
net of fate – into a dense fabric, from which the cloth of character is cut (1996: 203-204). 
Consequently, these threads of character are judged in quasi-ethical terms.
Benjamin refuses such a conflation on the grounds that, if it is problematic to assert that a 
person’s future can be read from distant external features (the stars, for example), it is no less 
problematic to suppose that inner character can be read from proximate external ones 
(physiognomy or gestures, for example). But if character can be read from such external signs, 
then a pragmatic conception of the person as active or practical, and thus capable of changing 
bodily features or physical surroundings, implies that the production of signs cannot be limited to 
immediate causal connections but extends to the whole realm of wider experience, such as 
changes to the natural environment (1996: 201-2). Since this “active” or “pragmatic” conception 
of the person intervenes in that sphere previously associated with the fate that passively befalls a 
person, what Benjamin calls “character” cannot be delimited to the immediate context of the 
“inner” or “private” realm, and it thus threatens to contravene the very concept of character. 
Benjamin proposes that an adequate conception of character therefore needs to be 
delimited more clearly from the concept of fate. To do so, he introduces the distinction between 
cultic myth and theological justice: fate must be detached from its association with religious 
punishment, Benjamin insists, since this conception refers to misfortune only as divine 
punishment of the guilty, without any historical index of good fortune or happiness and the 
liberation from guilt. This touches upon what Steiner identifies as the central idea of Benjamin’s 
politics in this period: the realization of happiness. 
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In his fragment on capitalism as religion, this understanding of fate pertains to the 
mythical domain of the absolute cult, whose modern apotheosis is a capitalism which knows 
only duties and punishment and nothing of redemption and bliss. Benjamin identifies such fate 
with the law as “a residue of the demonic stage of human existence” (1996: 203), a demonic 
ambiguity associated in the Critique of Violence with the false equality of abstract rights, which 
are one manifestation of the violent power exerted in all mythical lawmaking (1996: 249). This 
demonic ambiguity perhaps finds its modern apotheosis in education, to the extent that the right 
to education is, in many instances, exceptional in simultaneously being a legally policed 
compulsion that must be exercised (see Blacker 2013: 196-97). 
The moral speechlessness and self-sacrifice of the tragic hero invokes the idea of justice 
against this cultic or demonic domain not by demanding compensation but by a protest that calls 
into question the very existence of this whole mythological order. But this tragic response, in its 
moral protest, remains at the same time sublimely bound to the mythical schema of sacrifice, the 
fatal nexus of misfortune and guilt. Turning then from tragedy to comedy (and perhaps 
influenced by Jean Paul’s the aesthetics of humor, discussed below), Benjamin seeks a 
dialectical, but also distinctively modern, counterpart to the sublimity of the tragic. If tragedy 
calls into question the mythical concept of fate that lacks any index of happiness, comedy calls 
into question a concept of character judged in ethical terms of guilt rather than the freedom of 
innocence. In comedy, characters are basically stripped of inner moral and psychological 
significance; as a consequence, they come to seem amoral types, for only actions are moral, 
Benjamin continues to insist, never traits of character. For example, in Molière “character 
develops...like a sun, in the brilliance of a single trait, which allows no other to remain visible in 
its proximity” (1996: 205): character as a shining beacon of innocence that illuminates the 
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freedom of actions. Freedom is revealed here through the comedic antihero’s or antiheroine’s 
moral and psychological innocence, understood in terms of simplicity, anonymity, and a certain 
asociality. If tragedy responds to the mythical concept of fate (which never condemns the 
individual, Orestes, as guilty but only the type, the doomed house of Atreus) with the moral 
individual, comedy responds to a modern concept of character – the ethical judgement of 
psychological individuality – with the happiness, innocence and simplicity of the amoral type.7 
There is, here, a shifting and blurring of the traditional privileging of Sophoclean  philanthropy - 
the valorization of endured suffering - over Molière’s misanthropic delight, and of the traditional 
differentiation of inner/outer or private/public. Only where moral education integrates the 
humorous – beyond the tragic heroism of educational responses to social fate – might the true 
salvation of character be possible. 
The Destructive Character
This points us not to the ethical suffering and the “solitude” of the creative individual but 
to the cheerfulness of the destructive character, who “must be constantly surrounded by people” 
(1999b: 542). Benjamin’s articulation of the destructive character type in the early 1930s is, 
among other figures, associated with his immanent critical engagement with Karl Kraus, author 
of the long-running and bitterly satirical journal Die Fackel, which Benjamin began reading in 
1918-1919, and in which Kraus raged against journalism and the press. Kraus’s condemnation of 
the corrupting influence of journalistic language was driven by recognition of the dissolution of 
intellectual and cultural life into what Benjamin calls “the satiety of healthy common sense, and 
the compromise intellectuals made with it in order to find shelter in journalism” (1999b: 446): in 
other words, the situation of educational culture, as conditioned by modern political economy, 
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that Nietzsche deplored. Nietzsche is also present in the subtitles to the sections of Benjamin’s 
essay of 1931, “Karl Kraus”: not merely in the inversion of the Nietzschean Übermensch in the 
final section, entitled Unmensch (the “Inhuman” or “Monster”), but also in the resonances 
between the first section on the Allmensch (the “All-Human,” translated into English as “Cosmic 
Man”) and Nietzsche’s Allzumenschliches (“All-Too-Human”). 
Benjamin recognizes in Kraus’s writings on modern journalism the condemnation of a 
thoroughly impoverished humanity, played out for Kraus in the erosion of the distinction 
between “private” and “public” life enacted by contemporary journalism. Against this, Kraus 
sides with the last vestige of the “creaturely” or “created” in human individuals: the withered 
interior of “private life” whose intellectual and sexual poles are under attack by a hypocritical 
public morality. For Benjamin, however, Kraus’s philanthropic interest in humanity stands out 
all the more clearly against the misanthropic background of the mythically demonic in which he 
is still immersed. It is not a profound “love of humanity” that really underlies Kraus satirical 
condemnation of intellectuals and journalists but a destructive and violent desire for vengeance. 
Kraus’s condemnation of humanity is, from this perspective, secretly rooted in capitalism’s cult-
like condemnation of humanity’s guilt. The antinomies diagnosed in Kraus’s thought by 
Benjamin reveal affinities with a Nietzschean vision of cultural emancipation through a natural 
(rather than historical) overcoming of the human in the figure of the Übermensch. 
Benjamin seeks an intervention within Kraus’s thought that would redeem the figure of 
emancipation from individualism and naturalism (where character is fate). To this end he 
identifies Kraus’s reaction against the classical ideal of humanity (his retreat from philanthropy 
into misanthropy staged as a withdrawal into withered private life) with an effectively 
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unconscious confession of the “materialist humanism” of the young Marx.8 Reading Kraus 
through Marx, Benjamin invokes an anthropological materialism, in which revolutionary 
political emancipation (the redemption of the “second nature” of the social order) is 
simultaneously the precondition and concomitant of the higher, collectively social emancipation 
of individual humans themselves (the redemption of “first nature” of human bodily life). 
The antiheroism of the asocial types of Moliere’s satirical Misanthrope is here brought 
into conjunction with an understanding of the utopian features of the misanthropy of the 
destructive character. This occurs in the final section of the 1931 essay on Kraus, where 
Benjamin reconstructs the wrath of Kraus as the beckoning of the Unmensch towards the 
Nietzschean Übermensch: “And therefore the monster stands among us as the messenger of a 
more real humanism ...One must have ...seen Klee’s New Angel (who preferred to free men by 
taking from them, rather than make them happy by giving to them) to understand a humanity that 
proves itself by destruction” (1999a: 452, 456). Simplicity of character and innocence of action 
are the preconditions for an affirmative conception of the poverty of experience and a positive 
revaluation of the barbarism (or, in artistic terms, the dadaism) of the cultural philistine.  With 
the monstrous figure of the inhuman, character becomes realigned with a freedom not, in the 
existential sense, to annihilate itself but, in the messianic sense, to annihilate the inhumanity of 
the world around it.
III. 
If they are fit and well, children are absolute monsters of activity:...tearing up, 
breaking up, building, they’re always at it.
- Paul Valéry, Ideé Fixe
19
If Benjamin’s anti-Nietzscheanism culminates in the figure of the inhuman, this is 
typically associated with the male, adult characters he invokes: Gustav Glück, Bertolt Brecht, 
Karl Kraus. This final section seeks to resituate the childlike inhumanism of the destructive 
character back into the context of education by retracing the development of an alternative 
pedagogical model, a model expounded against the tragic nihilism of the early writing on Youth 
and expanded into what Clark calls the “cryptic politics” of the later writings. In seeking to 
demonstrate the fundamentally pedagogical nature of Benjamin’s philosophy, it will conclude by 
drawing out the implications of an anti-Nietzschean pedagogy for the contemporary crisis of 
mass education. 
The religiosity that, in his earlier writings, resides in the solitude of community provides 
a problematic solution to the antinomy of moral education. As a consequence, the role of the 
educator becomes vexed. If “as we suspect, it is the case that all morality and religiosity 
originates in solitude with God,” Benjamin asks, who today would introduce the role of the 
mediator [Mittlerrolle] (between the individual and God) in the sphere of education (2011: 110)? 
The moral speech of the educator who seeks to mediate between Youth and culture is as clumsy 
and inept as the interfering cleric of Goethe’s Elective Affinities. Perhaps what is required instead 
is the example of a cultural leader: an educator (as Schopenhauer was for Nietzsche) but never 
an instructor. 
Benjamin provides some pedagogical answers to this problem in a letter to Scholem in 
1917. It is useful to read this  response in the context both of his explicit break from the 
leadership of Wyneken, with the consequent submerging of his “politics of Youth” into a harder 
radicalism, and the development of an anti-Nietzschean account of character as the agent rather 
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than object of education. Responding to Scholem’s claim (originally made in a discussion of the 
Blau-Weiss group of the Jewish Youth Movement) that “All work whose goal is not to set an 
example is nonsense,” Benjamin insists that the concept of “example” and of “influence” (and 
associated ideas of moral leadership) should be “excluded from the theory of education” (1994: 
93). In this context, the vaunted model of “example” is always limited to the empirically possible 
and educational “influence” to issues of power. “The life of the educator [Das Leben des 
Erziehenden], however, does not function indirectly [mittelbar],” Benjamin writes, “by setting an 
example’ (1994: 93). Benjamin now abandons the promise of solitude within religious 
community that the “Free School” movement once granted and returns to the significance of 
formal instruction previously rejected. Here, instruction [Unterricht] is defined as “education by 
means of teachings [Lehre] in its actual sense,” so that teaching itself “must therefore be in the 
middle [in der Mitte] of all ideas about education [Erziehung]” (1994: 94). Significantly, though, 
the teacher does not “learn before others” (as an example of learning in process) but is the one 
whose own learning has evolved into teachings. 
Since there is a continuous temporality involved – the qualitative transition from learning 
to teaching in the person of the educator, by which one is continually transformed into the other 
– Benjamin proposes that the concept of example be replaced by a concept of tradition as “the 
medium in which the person who is learning [der Lernende] continually transforms himself into 
the person who is teaching [in den Lehrehenden verwandelt]” (1994: 94). The significance of 
instruction involves making teachings communicable to others to receive in their own way: 
“Knowledge becomes transmittable [überlieferbar] only for the person who has understood his 
knowledge as something that has been transmitted [überliefertes]” (1994: 94). In this way, the 
educator’s relation to instruction resembles that of the older storyteller, in the sense that he or she 
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“takes what he tells from experience – his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it 
the experience of those who are listening to his tale”; that is, he or she transmits it (2002: 146). 
While the novel concerns the “solitary individual” and has no place for “instruction” 
[Unterweisungen], the storyteller’s connection to a “chain of tradition which passes a happening 
on from generation to generation” brings the storyteller into the ranks of teachers and sages 
(2002: 154). In Kafka’s writings, which represent the very “sickness of tradition” manifested in 
the epoch of the novel, one can see how it is possible to cling to the form of “transmissibility,” 
even if this must be at the expense of the content of truth.9 This is, Benjamin reminds us, the 
radiant serenity of Kafka’s messianic hope: “only a fool’s help is real help” and folly belongs to 
the creatures and (teaching) assistants (2002: 318-320). 
 In this sense, the instructor – who in playing a mediating role interrupts the solitude of 
the individual learner and intrudes upon the silence of the older generation of the school towards 
Youth – is not the block to education but rather its precondition: the one who mediates the 
relationship between generations. For the educator, like the breaking wave in the surging sea of 
teachings, “the only things that matters ...is to surrender itself to a motion in such a way that it 
crests and breaks” (1994: 94). Here, we are introduced to something akin to an alternative and 
law-destroying violence that The Critique of Violence identifies with justice (1996: 249). This is 
manifested not only by religious tradition, he claims, but also in “educative power, which in its 
perfected form stands outside the law” and serves as an “expiating moment” that may annihilate 
“goods, right, life, and suchlike” but never, we might say, the innocence of character (1994: 94). 
This breaking “is education in its actual sense” and instruction is the moment in which tradition 
emerges, becomes visible and free: “the only nexus of the free union of the old with the new 
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generation”. It leads to a new understanding of education as medium in which “everyone is an 
educator and everyone needs to be educated and everything is education.” 
This new conception of education as transmission provides the seed of the political 
positions developed across Benjamin’s subsequent work. It can be genealogically traced through 
notes associated with his major writings on The Concept of Criticism in Early German 
Romanticism (1919), One Way-Street (written 1923-6; published 1928), The Arcades Project 
(began in 1927) and early versions of the Work of Art essay (from the mid-1930s). In notes 
related to The Concept of Criticism in Early German Romanticism, for example, Benjamin 
speaks of a form of nonviolent control which “has more influence on the child in essential 
matters than anything else (more than corporeal punishment and, above all, more than the much 
vaunted power of example),” associating this with the Late Romantic theory of observation 
(1996: 286). Unlike early German Romanticism, the latter is centered not on reflection but on 
love, specifically on a form of pedagogic observation: “For the late Romantics, observation was 
a sun beneath whose rays the object of love opens up to further growth. But if its rays were 
withheld, the object of love remained in the dark and wilted” (1996: 285). 
The reference to late Romanticism here seems most directly to invoke Friedrich 
Schlegel’s pessimistic recasting of his earlier theory of irony (understood, as Benjamin explains 
in The Concept of Criticism, as “poetic reflection” which can progressively “raise this reflection 
to higher and higher powers” and so rise infinitely above all finiteness) into something more 
sceptical and tragic, as evinced in his last lectures: “Genuine irony is the irony of love. It arises 
from the feeling of finiteness and of one’s own limitations and the apparent contradiction of 
these feelings with the concept of the infinite inherent in all genuine love” (Behler 1998: 45-46). 
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However, a less direct but more apposite comparison – and one more in line with the 
comedic strand being emphasised in this approach – might be made to Jean Paul’s doctrine on 
education Levana. This also deploys the romantic trope of the learner blooming in the warmth 
and light of the educator’s consciousness: “whenever a sunbeam strikes [the child’s 
consciousness] …(for all teaching is warming into life rather than sowing) there the green leaves 
burst forth,” and the “fruit” of self-consciousness “bursts through the clouds like a sun, and 
wonderfully reveals a beaming universe” (1891: 103).  Jean Paul, like Benjamin in his discussion 
of Late Romanticism, distinguishes this self-consciousness from both the reflection of early 
Romanticism and the supersensible moral faculty discovered through the experience of the 
sublime; it marks not what he regards as the empty mirroring of Fichtean reflection but a more 
simplistic “inner sense” (1891: 114). In the aesthetic theory laid out in On the Natural Magic of 
Imagination and the Preschool for Aesthetics, Jean Paul deploys the idea of humor against the 
similarly conceived infinite progress of Romantic irony and the punctual sense of being 
overwhelmed of the Kantian sublime (Fleming 2006: 48). The humor of what he calls “Romantic 
comic poetry” deflates both the infinite contrasts of Romantic poetry (and their tragic aftermath) 
and the finite contrast of comedy by contrasting both perspectives against each other, resulting 
in a negative infinity that “annihilates both great and small, because before the infinite, 
everything is equal and nothing” (1973: 88-89). This idea of humor “as the inverted sublime 
annihilates not the individual,” however, “but the finite through its contrast with the idea. It 
recognizes no individual foolishness, no fools, but only folly and a mad world” (1973: 88).10
To return to Benjamin’s discussion of education: what is key is that this model of 
observation (which “is much more important …than reflection” and “exemplary” in the sphere of 
pedagogy) is a medium in which both the growing child, who is educated by the regulating 
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observation of the adult, and the observing adult, whose eye is regulated and “learns to see what 
is appropriate to the child,” are mutually interactive (1996: 285). This posits education as a 
medium of intergenerational and pragmatic transmission, at once theoretical and practical, in 
which both educator and educated are simultaneously educated. The problem that occurs when 
this model is transposed to the sphere of historical growth within human society, as happens with 
the later Romanticism of Schlegel and Carl von Savigny, is that historical development concerns 
not solely peaceful growth but also bloody conflict, and therefore requires the introduction of 
theological concepts of justice as well (Benjamin 1996: 285). 
Benjamin himself takes up this pedagogical model on a grand, historical scale in One-
Way Street and in the earlier version of the Work of Art essay, where he claims that the purpose 
of technology is misconceived as the imperialist mastery of nature in the same way that the cane-
wielder teaches the purpose of education to be the mastery of children (1996: 487). Correcting 
this misconception, he counters: “Is not education, above all, the indispensable ordering of the 
relationship between generations and therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that 
relationship and not children? And likewise technology is the mastery not of nature but the 
relationship between nature and humanity” (487). In the Work of Art essay, this romantic model 
of pedagogy therefore provides Benjamin with his messianic distinction between “first” and 
“second” technology. The former aims at a mastery over nature through the maximal possible 
utilization of human beings, whose consequences are valid for all time (a vision culminating in 
mythical guilt and sacrifice). The latter is distinguished from the first in seeking the minimal 
possible use of human beings through provisional and improvised experimentation and testing, 
whose goal is not mastery over nature but an interplay between nature and humanity that is 
liberating for both. 
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In this way, Benjamin’s pedagogical position – itself constructed out of the submerged 
tragic failings of the Youth Movement itself – resurfaces in his later work (in connection with the 
intellectual influence of Asja Lacis’s own theory of pedagogic observation)11 to constitute the 
basis of the political positions developed around the historical transformation of culture and 
technology. Education, conceived on the model of a transmissibility (rather than discipline or 
example) that mediates between historical generations, is here generalized to provide the 
framework for a cosmic understanding of a non-mythical, theologically-infused technology as 
the mediation between humanity and nature. In this world-historical context, technology assumes 
the educative power ascribed to the transmissibility of tradition: it is the bridge (and not the 
threatened breach) between humanity and nature and a source of their mutual interplay and 
transformation.  
The preceding sections have sought to show how Benjamin’s rejection of his earlier, 
Nietzschean-inspired “politics of Youth” constitutes the submerged and therefore “cryptic” 
foundations from which he attempts to wrest an anti-Nietzschean politics. This involves not a 
break from his youthful interest in pedagogy but its cosmic reframing and expansion to 
encompass the transformation not just of every younger generation but of humanity as a whole in 
its relationship with technology and nature. For Benjamin, the barbaric or Dadaist destruction of 
bourgeois culture and of the solitariness of the bourgeois individual represents the inception of a 
new collective and technologically interconnected physis. Given the sense that now everything 
becomes education, most notably issues pertaining to revolutionary social struggle, it is possible 
to understand the “cryptic politics” concealed in The Arcades Project as a circling around this 
idea of revolution as pedagogical. 
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The Inhumanities
If revolutionary politics assumes a pedagogical dimension in the anthropological 
materialism of Benjamin’s mature writings, the more specific question of the end of formal 
education with which this discussion started might now be considered from the perspective of an 
anthropological materialist understanding of pedagogy. What lessons might Benjamin’s mature 
anti-Nietzscheanism hold for the contemporary crisis of educational systems, as they undergo the 
transforming pressures of a short-term “politicization” (often led by the State or by corporations 
acting in the interests of the State) and encounter the expectations of social justice connected to 
expansion and “massification”? Here, I want to draw together the strands of Benjamin’s anti-
Nietzscheanism delineated in the foregoing discussion: first, the way in which the centrality of 
instruction in the process of transmission involves not the silencing of one generation before 
another but the concentrated historical transmissibility or dialogic interplay between generations; 
second, the way in which the simplicity, generality and innocence of student character might be 
foregrounded not as a social problem for education to resolve (in the formation or cultivation of 
“character” through moral or civic education) but as possessing a positively monstrous and 
destructive agency in relation to this educational process. 
Kraus’s highest achievement, for Benjamin, is that he makes even the newspaper 
quotable, wrenching it destructively from its context but thereby transporting the empty phrase 
into his own sphere, simultaneously punishing and saving it. In connection with this, Benjamin 
invokes the figure of the child, as the teacher of humanity: Kraus “never envisaged the child as 
the object of education; rather, in an image from his own youth, he saw the child as the 
antagonist of education who is educated by this antagonism, not by the educator” (1999b: 452). 
Here, the role of student as antagonistic agent in relation to the teacher as transmitter of learnings 
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is clarified: the teacher must transform what he or she has learned in order to make it 
transmissible or quotable for the learner who provokes such transformation; education is the 
antagonistic medium of such transmissibility. In a comedic blow to the vanity of academics, it 
assigns the educative force that Benjamin discerned as a manifestation of divine violence to the 
learner rather than the educator, who is nonetheless required as the intermediary object of this 
force.   
Speaking of the literary impoverishment of the genius into journalism in “The Author as 
Producer,” as in the Work of Art essay, Benjamin writes: “The scene of this literary confusion is 
the newspaper, its content, ‘subject matter’ that denies itself any other form of organization than 
that imposed on it by readers’ impatience. And this impatience is not just that of the politician 
expecting information, or of the speculator looking for a stock tip; behind its smoulders the 
impatience of people who are excluded and think they have the right to see their own interests 
expressed” (1999b: 771). Journalism therefore conceals a dialectical moment: the dissolution of 
the conventional distinction between the author and public. Benjamin thus asserts the 
pedagogical usefulness of this impoverishment of culture into journalism, against Nietzsche’s 
untimely meditations on the eternal value of culture: “It is, in a word, the literarization of the 
conditions of living that masters the otherwise insoluble antinomies [of the literary apparatus]. 
And it is at the scene of the limitless debasement of the word – the newspaper, in short – that 
salvation is being prepared” (1999b: 772). 
It is only more recently that social and technological innovations in education have 
brought the same tensions that previously manifested themselves in the sphere of literature and 
culture to a comparable critical moment. How might we therefore begin to think our 
contemporary pedagogization12 of living conditions – the conflation of the time and space of 
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education with that of political society – as containing a dialectical kernel, and what are the 
implications for instruction in the new spaces of massified and increasingly privatized education? 
Here, we might begin to think about not merely the impatience of students but also the affective 
dimensions of their distraction, boredom, frustration and desire to be entertained, much of which 
is technologically shaped in relation to new forms of (anti-)social media, as instances of 
pedagogical agency themselves. 
This is intended to serve as a polemical rebuke to any overly-simplistic rhetorical 
construction of students as consumers, which tends to narrow the criteria of student agency to 
legitimated models of creative, social behavior (modelled on that practiced by the educators) and 
therefore to cast the student as predominantly passive or apathetic. Too often, this fails to 
distinguish effects of the commodification, marketization and privatization of educational 
institutions from the longer ongoing process of massification in both a social and historical 
sense. A key historical locus of antagonism within current intergenerational transmission, for 
example, is that between the experiences of so-called “digital natives” being taught and the 
“digital immigrants” teaching them (Prensky 2001). Equally, the creative self-formation of 
individual students so prized by the liberal arts and humanities often fails to register the extent to 
which these soft skills of character, resilience, empathy, spontaneity, critical thinking and so on 
are increasingly valued as “human capital” not merely in the creative and service industries but 
by businesses in general (Martin 2008). This is therefore also a call to remain committed to the 
antagonistic spaces of mass education as sites of continuing struggle and transformation, and not 
to voluntarily abandon them at the historical moment they have become, relatively speaking, 
ever more diverse in terms of the class, gender and ethnicity of the student body.
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In an unpublished fragment associated with his writings on the Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche proclaims: “Now one can only place hope in the strata of the lower, uneducated 
humans…. Those humans who still know what misery is will also feel what wisdom can be for 
them. The greatest danger is when the uneducated strata [ungelehrten Klassen] become infected 
with the yeast of present education [jetzigen Bildung]. Every alliance with the ‘educated’ 
[Gebildeten] is to be rejected” (Hutter 2006: 34). In contrast, the process of pedagogization, 
anticipated in negative terms as the ongoing merging of the “educated” and the masses through 
education in Nietzsche’s early writings, holds open the possibility for a Benjaminian analysis of 
the debasement and salvation of education itself: it is the scene of an interplay between 
generations in which the antagonistic and destructive demands of the student provoke ever-new 
transformations and revisions of the educator, the educational institution, and the documents of 
education, so as to render them transmissible for the coming generation. 
It is this revolution that Benjamin anticipates when, in his unpublished note on re-
examining the relationship between teaching and research, he imagines an alternative approach 
to education based on the principle that “teaching is capable of adapting to new strata of students 
in such a way that a rearrangement of the subject matter would give rise to entirely new forms of 
knowledge” (1999b: 419-20). Accordingly, “subjects that have long been investigated and 
appropriated by scholars need to be emancipated from the forms in which such scholarly 
acquisition took place, if they are still to have any value and any defined character today;” such 
emancipation would lead to “a less banal, more considered learning,” but also to the overthrow 
of “the whole pernicious spectrum of critical methods” favored by researchers. “In short,” 
Benjamin concludes, “we should not look to research to lead a revival in teaching; instead, it is 
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more important to strive with a certain intransigence for an – albeit very indirect – improvement 
in research to emerge from the teaching” (1999b: 419). 
This kind of teaching-led research is not about improving the quality and learning 
outcomes of teaching through the research of the educator or empirical research into education; 
nor is it about turning the student as consumer into the student as producer or researcher, as is 
understood within the existing apparatus of scholarly knowledge. Rather, it seeks to reconsider 
the dialectical value of destruction and de-formation (rather than the uncritical valorization of 
creation and formation) within the educational process and – in contrast to the usual 
understanding of this process encroaching on education from without – to ascribe this agency to 
the learner, whose object is the educational apparatus itself. 
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